Reflexiones para una elaboración conceptual del proceso de chantaje, a partir del problema de selección adversa

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Iván Montoya Restrepo
Luz Alexandra Montoya Restrepo

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Abstract

El presente documento relaciona algunos de los principales aspectos sobre los cuales el enfoque de economía de la información reflexiona frente al funcionamiento del mercado. Además ofrece una breve introducción sobre la señalización en el mercado de trabajo y el modelo de selección adversa. Posteriormente emplea este marco conceptual para ofrecer consideraciones sobre un modelo de chantaje y ofrece algunas conclusiones.

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