Reflexiones para una elaboración conceptual del proceso de chantaje, a partir del problema de selección adversa
Keywords:
Selección adversa, chantaje, asimetría de informaciónAbstract
El presente documento relaciona algunos de los principales aspectos sobre los cuales el enfoque de economía de la información reflexiona frente al funcionamiento del mercado. Además ofrece una breve introducción sobre la señalización en el mercado de trabajo y el modelo de selección adversa. Posteriormente emplea este marco conceptual para ofrecer consideraciones sobre un modelo de chantaje y ofrece algunas conclusiones.
Downloads
References
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3. (Aug., 1970), pp. 488-500.
Anton J.J. y Yao, D.A. (1994). Expropriation and inventions: appropriable rents in the absence of property rights. The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1. (Mar., 1994), pp. 190-209.
Anton J.J. y Yao, D.A. (2002). The Sale of ideas: strategic disclosure, property rights, and contracting. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 3. (Jul., 2002), pp. 513-531.
MacdonalD, G. M. (1984) New Directions in the Economic Theory of Agency. The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 17, No. 3. (Aug., 1984), pp. 415-440.
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary. (2005) En: http://www.britannica.com
Riley. J. G. (2001). Silver Rules: Twenty Five Years Screening and Signaling. Journal of Economic Literature. Jun, 2001.
Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1976) Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 4. (Nov., 1976), pp. 629-649.
Spence, M. (1973) Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3. (Aug., 1973), pp. 355-374.
Spence, M. (1976). Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 1. (Feb., 1976), pp. 51-74.
Spence, M. (2001) Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets. Prize Lecture, Dec. 08. Ver también SPENCE, M. (2002) Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 3. (Jun., 2002), pp. 434-459.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2001) Information and the change in the paradigm in economics. Prize Lecture, Dec. 08. Ver también STIGLITZ, J.E. (2002) Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 3. (Jun., 2002), pp. 460-501.
Valín, J. (2004) Héroes de la Libertad. En: http://www.jorgevalin.com/artic/heroes_libertad.htm, 04/10/2004.
Yao, D.A. (1988). Beyond the Reach of the Invisible Hand: Impediments to Economic Activity, Market Failures, and Profitability. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 9, Special Issue: Strategy Content Research. (Summer, 1988), pp. 59-70.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
- Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgment of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgment of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).
