Crime and Punishment Analysis: Land Invasion "Para-institutions" in Cali
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17230/ecos.2014.38.4Keywords:
Crime, Police and Judicial System, Invasion, Deterrence, MigrationAbstract
Based on the crime economics of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), including the impact of the migratory flow, this paper studies the reasons why some individuals choose to strategically, rationally, and contingently become involved in illegal land invasion "para-institutions" in Cali since the 1950s. This will be done by modeling the efficiency of justice in order to discourage invaders through simulations of sentences and arrest likelihood and deterrent punishment under three "para-institutions": invasive dynasty, organized invasion and contingent invasion (endogenous migratory flow.) These simulations will be anchored to calibrated actual parameters of the relevant population. This will allow the calibration of the line of indifference (division) among individuals with invasive (and incentives to illegality) and non-invasive behaviors. Finally, a policy proposal will be devised to help correct the inefficiencies found in the sanctioning mechanisms, if applicable.
Downloads
References
Agrast, M.; Botero, J. y Ponce, A. (2010). WJP Rule of Law Index. The World Justice Project.
Álvarez, M. (2012). Las invasiones de tierras y la izquierda en la ciudad. Montevideo, Uruguay, 1984-2011. Revista de Ciencia Política, 32(2), 411-31.
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169-217.
Brock, W. y Durlauf, S. (2000). Discrete Choice with Social Interactions. Review of Economic Studies.
Brueckner, J. (2012). Urban Squatting with Rent-Seeking Organizers. Cesifo Working Paper, 3920.
Calderón, J. (2000). Titulación de la propiedad y mercado de tierras. EURE (Santiago), 37(111), 47-77.
Ehrlich, I. (1973). Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation. Journal of Political Economy.
Estrada, J. (1994). Crime and Punishment: An Introductory Analysis in a Noncooperative Framework. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper.
Hidalgo, D.; Naidu, R.; Nichter, S. y Richardson, N. (2010). Occupational Choices: Economic Determinants of Land Invasions. Review of Economics and Statistics.
Jiménez, E. (1985). Urban Squatting and Community Organization in Developing Countries. Journal of Public Economics, 27, 69-92.
Lanjouw, J. y Levy, P. (2002). Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal Property Rights in Urban Ecuador. Economic Journal, 112, 986-1019.
Polyzos, S. y Minetos, D. (2009). Informal Housing in Greece: A Quantitative Spatial Analysis, Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management. University of Thessaly.
Rodríguez-Raga, J. y Seligson, M. (2010). Cultura política de la democracia en Colombia, 2009. Barómetro de las Américas.
Transparency International (2009). Informe sobre el barómetro global de la corrupción.
Vásquez, E. (2001). Historia de Cali del siglo XX. Cali, Colombia: Artes Gráficas del Valle.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
- Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgment of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgment of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).
