What Optimistic Responses to Deep Disagreement get Right (and Wrong)

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17230/co-herencia.17.32.8

Keywords:

Deep Disagreement, Skepticism, Problem of the Criterion, argumentation

Abstract

In this paper, I argue for three theses. First, that the problem of Deep Disagreement is usefully understood as an instance of the skeptical Problem of the Criterion. Second, there are structural similarities between proposed optimistic answers to deep disagreement and the problem of the criterion. Third, in light of these similarities, there are both good and bad consequences for proposed solutions to the problem of deep disagreement.

Author Biography

  • Scott F. Aikin, Vanderbilt University

    Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Director of Undergraduate Studies at Vanderbilt University, USA

References

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Godden, D. M., & Brenner, W. H. (2010). Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement. Universidad Diego Portales, Centro de Estudios de la Argumentación y el Razonamiento.

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Published

2020-06-24

Issue

Vol. 17 No. 32 (2020): Argumentation, deliberation and collective action

Section

Articles

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How to Cite

Aikin, S. F. (2020). What Optimistic Responses to Deep Disagreement get Right (and Wrong). Co-herencia, 17(32), 225-238. https://doi.org/10.17230/co-herencia.17.32.8