Socrates on Egoism. Does he say we should be virtuous and egoists?

Diana Hoyos Valdés

doi:10.17230/co-herencia.10.19.2

Diana Hoyos Valdés

University of Caldas

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3940-7567

Keywords

eudaimonia, virtues, egoism, Socrates, Klosko, Nakhnikian, Rudebusch, Irwin

Abstract

In this paper I address the issue whether Socratic eudaimonia entails egoism. It is, whether according to Socrates’ view a man who acts having his happiness as final criteria for his acts is an egoist. This view seems to be in contradiction with what we commonly think a moral theory must say. I gather previous attempts to answer this question in two big groups: formalists and substantivists, based on their general objectives. I argue that the second kind of approach is more effective because it tries to see and interpret Socratic theory as a whole and make it more coherent. It takes Socrates as providing a theory of human motivation to act in which the agent seeks his happiness, but in which friendship, love, and justice play a fundamental role.

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References

Bobonich, C. (2011). “Socrates and Eudaimonia”, in: D. R. Morrison (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Socrates. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Irwin, Terence (1977). Plato’s Moral Theory, The Early and Middle Dialo-gues. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Klosko, George (1980). «On the Analysis of “Protagoras”», en: Phoenix, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 307-322.

Nakhnikian, George (1973). “The First Socratic Paradox”, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy. Volume 11, Number 1, January.

Penner, Terry (2010). “Socratic Ethics and Socratic Psychology of Ac-tion”, in: The Cambridge Companion to Socrates. Cambridge University Press.

Plato (1997). Complete Works. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by John M. Cooper. Hackett Publishing Company.

Priece, A. W. (1989). Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Clarendon Paperbacks.

Rudebush, George (2003). “Socratic Perfectionism”, in: Desire, Identity and Existence; Essays in honor to T.M. Penner. Kelowna B.C., Canada.

Segvic, Heda (2006). “No One Errs Willingly: the Meaning of Socratic Intellectualism”, in: A Companion to Socrates. Oxford: Blackwell.

Vlastos, Gregory (1981). Platonic Studies. Princeton University Press.

PDF (Español)

Published

Nov 28, 2013

DOI https://doi.org/10.17230/co-herencia.10.19.2

How to Cite

Hoyos Valdés, D. (2013). Socrates on Egoism. Does he say we should be virtuous and egoists?. Co-Herencia, 10(19), 41–56. https://doi.org/10.17230/co-herencia.10.19.2

Issue

Vol. 10 No. 19 (2013)

Section

Articles

Supporting Agencies

Author Biography

Diana Hoyos Valdés, University of Caldas

Master in Philosophy, University of Caldas, Manizales, Colombia. PhD Philosophy Student at the University of Oklahoma-USA. Fulbrighter 2011. Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Caldas.

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