Historical conditions of possibility of the General Point of View an upgradable solution to the metaethical Humean problem of moral cognitivism
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Keywords
Moral cognitivism, General Point of View, projectivism, quasi-realism, moral internalism.
Abstract
This paper offers a solution to the metaethical problem that flourishes in Hume’s ethics concerning the conciliation between the cognitivism derived from the demands of the General Point of View and the moral internalism that results from its reasoning of motivation. Through the assumption of an evolutionary description in the construction of an evaluative perspective represented by the General Point of View, and at the same time an epistemological projectivism for the causal judgments that connect motivations, actions and usefulness of the different characters that emerge from the origins of justice, it can be reconciled –with no risk against the consistency of Hume’s approach – that there is existence of individuals who are capable of creating cognitive moral judgments resulting in an internalist moral motivation, which is identified with the sense of duty, and individuals with clearly externalist motivations based on the instrumental use of reason.
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