Wittgenstein's solution to the problem of the "concept horse", or how to talk about the structure of the language according to the Tractatus
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Keywords
Concept horse, formal concept, Tractatus, logical concepts.
Abstract
This article asserts that the distinction made by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus between ‘ordinary concepts’ and ‘formal concepts’ may be construed as a response to the difficulties arising from the Fregean distinction between concept and object, which are traditionally referred to as the ‘concept horse problem’. The paper will show that contradictory and paradoxical expressions that arise both from the attack to the Fregean distinction (e.g., the concept horse is an object) and from its defense (e.g., the concept horse is not a concept), are rooted in an illegitimate attempt, namely, to describe or characterize the logical structure of the proposition by using other propositions. The distinction between ordinary and formal concepts makes it possible to clarify, first, in what sense these expressions are nonsensical; and second, that the distinction between concept and object can only be recognized in symbolism by the characteristics of signs, but it cannot be the object of description.
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References
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Article Details
Víctor Hugo Chica Pérez, Universidad de Antioquia
Profesor del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad de Antioquia, Medellín, Colombia.
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