Phenomenology and the ideal of science. In the century of article Philosophy as Rigorous Science

Abstract

Did Husserl give up the ideal of the rigorous science —exposed and brought to its maximum demand in the Article for Logos Journal in 1911? Or, in the contrary, does this ideal of rigorous science lead the whole Husserl’s work, and is this ideal the key of the whole phenomenology since its beginnings to the end? If it is adopted the view of the abandonment of the strict ideal of science, the observation of Krisis (Hua. VI, p. 508), it might have the character of correction of the whole phenomenological project. On the other hand, if the idea of rigorous science is adopted as conducting thread from the beginning to the end of Husserl’s thought, the mentioned observation would be restricted to a metaphor. To develop our reflection, we will go to establish what is indicated under the title science and more exactly rigorous science in the Article given the same name. It is going to characterize the sense where phenomenology is psychology; and as one and another are principles for sciences. It is here mentioned without discussion, the topic of the historicism and the criticism that Husserl does about it. Likewise, the naturalism –in general– as well as its consequences in relation to the psychology and history is out of the analysis.