Critical Agent, Deliberative Democracy, and Reason-Giving

Main Article Content

Cristián Santibáñez https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6755-3468

Keywords

Argumentation, critical agency, deliberation, democracy, reasons

Abstract

This paper aims at proposing a concept of a critical agent in dialogue with the practice of deliberative democracy, considering what reason-giving means. For this purpose, this paper first discusses what being or tending to be critical of oneself or third parties would mean. This section mainly draws on ideas from the theory of argumentation and informal logic. Second, the concept of deliberative democracy is addressed in light of the conceptual synergy that would be the result of the (potential) participation of a critical agent in such a sociopolitical context. This section examines some of the core ideas within the theory of deliberative democracy. Subsequently, the third and last section discusses Brandom’s inferentialist semantic proposal (2002, 2005) to address the problem of giving and receiving reason and see how this approach can contribute to a deliberation theory and a concept (and the education) of a critical agent. The conclusion section summarizes the main ideas and offers a counterpoint between the notion of agency, an important notion in my proposal, and the idea of person, a particularly valuable aspect in the theory of deliberative democracy.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.
Abstract 1103 | PDF (Español) Downloads 453

References

Aberdein, A. (2010). Virtue in Argument. Argumentation, 24(2), 165-179. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-009-9160-0

Aberdein, A. (2014a). In Defence of Virtue: The Legitimacy of Agent-Based Argument Appraisal. Informal Logic, 34(1), 77-93. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v34i1.3938

Aberdein, A. (2014b). Fallacy and argumentational vice. En D. Mohammed & M. Lewinski (Eds.), Virtues in Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA). [CD-ROM].

Barber, B. (1984). Democracia fuerte. Almazara.

Bailin, S. & Battersby, M. (2016). Reason in the Balance: An Inquiry Approach to Critical Thinking. McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

Barber, B. (2000). Un lugar para todos: Cómo fortalecer la democracia y la sociedad civil. Paidós.

Benhabib, S. (1994). Deliberative rationality and models of democratic legitimacy. Constellations, 1(1), 26-52. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8675.1994.tb00003.x

Bessette, J. (1980). Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government. En R. Golwin y W. Schambre (Eds.), How Democratic is the Constitution? (pp. 102-116). American Enterprise Institute.

Bessette, J. (1994). The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bohman, J. (1995). Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism: Political Liberalism and the Problem of Moral Conflict. Political Theory, 23(2), 253-279. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591795023002004

Bohman, J. (1996). Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy. MIT Press.

Bohman, J. (2016 [1998]). La madurez de la democracia deliberativa. Co-herencia, 13(24), 105-143. https://doi.org/10.17230/co-herencia.13.24.5

Brandom, R. (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press.

Brandom, R. (2002). La articulación de las razones. Siglo XXI.

Brandom, R. (2005). Hacerlo explícito. Herder.

Brower, B. (1994). The Limits of Public Reason. The Journal of Philosophy, 91(1), 5-26. https://www.jstor.org/stable/i352529

Cohen, D. (2009). Keeping an Open Mind and Having a Sense of Proportion as Virtues in Argumentation. Cogency, 1(2), 49-64.

Dryzek, J. (1990). Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science. Cambridge University Press.

Dryzek, J. (2010). Rhetoric in Democracy: A Systemic Appreciation. Political Theory, 38(3), 319-339. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591709359596

Elstub, S. (2010). The Third Generation of Deliberative Democracy. Political Studies Review, 8(3), 291-307. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-9302.2010.00216.x

Enfield, N. & Kockelman, P. (Eds.). (2017). Distributed Agency. Oxford University Press.

Enfield, N. (2017). Distribution of Agency. En N. Enfield & P. Kockelman (Eds.), Distributed Agency (pp. 9-14). Oxford University Press.

García Jaramillo, L. (Coord.). (2011). La democracia deliberativa a debate. Fondo Editorial EAFIT.

Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious. Viking Press.

Gigerenzer, G. (2008). Rationality for Mortals. How People Cope with Uncertainty. Oxford University Press.

Gigerenzer, G. (2010). Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2(3), 528-554. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01094.x

Gigerenzer, G. & Brighton, H. (2009). Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(1), 107-143. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x

González de Prado, J. & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2015). Collective Actors without Collective Minds: An Inferentialist Approach. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 45(1), 3-25. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393113520397

Goodin, R. (2003). Reflective Democracy. Oxford University Press.

Gutmann, A. (2003). Identity in Democracy. Princeton University Press.

Habermas, J. (1998a). Facticidad y validez. Trotta.

Habermas, J. (1998b). Reconciliación mediante el uso público de la razón. En J. Habermas & J. Rawls (Eds.), Debate sobre el liberalismo político (pp. 147-181). Paidós.

Hamblin, C. (1970). Fallacies. Methuen.

Hildebrandt, F. & Musholt, K. (2020). Teaching Rationality: Sustained Shared Thinking as a Means for Learning to Navigate the Space of Reason. Journal of Philosophy of Education. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12407

Hong, L. & Page, S. (2001). Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents. Journal of Economic Theory, 97(1), 123-163. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2709


Hong, L. & Page, S. (2012). Some Micro-foundations of collective Wisdom. En H. Landemore & J. Elster (Eds.), Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms (pp. 56-71). Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, R. & Hamby, B. (2015). A Meta-Level Approach to the Problem of Defining ‘Critical Thinking’. Argumentation, 29, 417-430. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-015-9356-4

Knight, J. & Johnson, J. (1994). Aggregation and deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy. Political Theory, 22(2), 277-296. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591794022002004

Landemore, H. (2013). Democratic Reason. Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many. Princeton University Press.

Leitão, S. (2000). The Potential of Argument in Knowledge Building. Human Development 43(6), 332-360. https://doi.org/10.1159/000022695

MacFarlane, J. (2010). Pragmatism and Inferentialism. En B. Weiss & J. Wanderer (Eds.), Reading Brandom (pp. 81-95). Routledge.

Manin, B. (1987). On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation. Political Theory, 15(3), 338-368. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591787015003005

Manin, B. (1998). Los principios del gobierno representativo. Alianza.

Mansbridge, J. J. (1983). Beyond Adversary Democracy. University of Chicago Press.

Mercier, H. & Sperber, D. (2017). The Enigma of Reason. A New Theory of Human Understanding. Allen Lane.

Mercier, H. & Landemore, H. (2012). Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation. Political Psychology, 33(2), 243-258. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00873.x

Michelman, F. (1997). How Can the People Ever Make the Law? (A Critique of Deliberative Democracy). The Modern Schoolman, 74(4), 311-330.

Page, S. (2007). The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies. Princeton University Press.

Pérez Zafrilla, P. J. (2017). La democracia en cuestión: Los ciudadanos demandan una política diferente. Biblioteca Nueva.

Putnam, H. & Habermas, J. (2008). Normas y valores. Trotta.

Rawls, J. (1985). Justice as Fairness: Political, not Metaphysical. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14(3), 223-251. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265349

Rawls, J. (1996). Liberalismo político. Crítica.

Rosenblatt, H. (2018). The Lost History of Liberalism: From Ancient Rome to the Twenty-First Century. Princeton University Press.

Santibáñez, C. (2011). Certeza animal: ¿Un tercer Wittgenstein? Revista Atenea, (504), 177-190. http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-04622011000200010

Santibáñez, C. (2012). ¿Desde el lenguaje a las instituciones? Discutiendo la propuesta de Searle. Estudios Filológicos, (50), 127-146. http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0071-17132012000200008

Santibáñez, C. (2018). Origen y función de la argumentación. Pasos hacia una explicación evolutiva y cognitiva. Palestra Editores.

Scanlon, T. (1982). Constructivism and Utilitarianism. En A. Sen & B. Williams (Eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond (pp. 103-128). Cambridge University Press.

Searle, J. (2001). Rationality in Action. MIT Press.

Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1996). Relevance: Communication and Cognition, 2.ª ed. Wiley-Blackwell.

Toulmin, S., Rieke, R. & Janik, A. (1979). Introduction to Reasoning. Macmillan Pub.

Van Eemeren, F. (2018). Argumentation Theory: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. Springer.

Van Eemeren, F. H. & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach. Cambridge University Press.

Vega Reñón, L. (2017). Lógica para ciudadanos. Ensayos sobre Lógica civil. EAE.

Walton, D. (2006). Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation. Cambridge University Press.

Walton, D. & Krabbe, E. (1995). Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning. State University of New York Press.

Wanderer, J. (2008). Robert Brandom. McGill-Queen’s University Press.