Mindreading, representación, inferencia y argumentación
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Este artículo tiene por objetivo aportar en la explicación de la función que cumplen las subcompetencias cognitivas mindreading y la representación mental en la actividad inferencial y el comportamiento argumentativo. El texto discute varias explicaciones alternativas existente en la literatura filosófica y cognitiva, decantándose por una perspectiva evolutiva cultural que pone el acento en el diseño colectivista. Para este efecto, se aborda el cambio evolutivo de la plasticidad cerebro-mente, se discute el alcance de la hipótesis de la inteligencia social y se confrontan distintas nociones de mindreading.
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Referências
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Bermúdez, José (2003). Thinking without words. NY: Oxford University Press.
Bickerton, Derek (2014). More than Nature Needs. Language, Mind, and Evolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bickerton, Derek (1990). Language and Species. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
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Buttelmann, David, Malinda Carpenter y Michael Tomasello (2009). “Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm”. En: Cognition, Vol. 112, pp. 337-342.
Carruthers, Peter (2011). The Opacity of Mind. An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. NY: Oxford University Press.
Churchland, Patricia (2011). Braintrust. What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Corbalis, Michael (2011). The Recursive Mind. The Origins of Human Lan-guage, Though, and Civilization. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cosmides, Leda y John Tooby (1992). “Cognitive adaptations for social exchange”. En: Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides y John Tooby (eds.). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (pp. 163-228). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Csibra, Gergely (2010). “Recognizing Communicative Intentions in In-fancy”. En: Mind & Language, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 141-168.
Deacon, Terrence (1997). The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Lan-guage and the Human Brain. London: Penguin.
Dennett, Daniel (1983). “Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: the “Panglossian paradigm” defended”. En: Behavioral and Brain Science, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 343-390.
Dennett, Daniel (1996). Kinds of Minds. Toward an Understanding of Consciousness. NY: Basic Books.
Dunbar, Robin (2004). The Human Story. Chatham, Kent: Faber & Faber.
Evans, Jonathan (2007). Hypothetical Thinking: Dual Processes in Reasoning and Judgement. Hove: Psychology Press.
Evans, Jonathan (2010). Thinking Twice. Two Minds in One Brain. NY: Oxford University Press.
Fehr, Ernst y Urs Fischbacher (2003). “The nature of human altruism”. En: Nature, Vol. 425, pp. 785-791.
Geary, David (2005). The Origin of Mind: Evolution of Brain, Cognition, and General Intelligence. Washington, DC: American Psychological Asso-ciation.
Goldman, Alvin (2006). Simulating Minds. The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. NY: Oxford University Press.
Gopnik, Alison (1996). “The scientist as child”. En: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 485-514.
Gordon, Robert (1996). “Radical simulationism”. En: Peter Carruthers y Peter Smith (eds.). Theories of Theories of Mind (pp. 11-21). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hurford, James (2007). The Origins of Meaning. Language in the Light of Evolution. NY: Oxford University Press.
Hwanga, Sung y Samuel Bowles (2012). “¿Is altruism bad for cooperation?” En: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 330-341.
Klima, Gyula (2011). “Tradition and Innovation in Medieval Theories of Mental Representation”. En: Gyula Klima y Alexander W. Hall (eds.). Mental Representation. Vol. 4: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics (pp. 7-16). Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Lewis, David (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lowe, Jonathon (2000). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mameli, Matteo (2001). “Mindreading, mindshaping, and evolution”. En: Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 16, pp. 491-514.
Marler, Peter (1977). “The evolution of Communication”. En: Thomas A. Sebeok (ed.). How Animals Communicate (pp. 45-70). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Mercier, Hugo y Dan Sperber (2011). “Why do human reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory”. En: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 57-74.
Nichols, Shaun y Stephen Stich (2003). Mindreading. NY: Oxford Uni-versity Press.
Onishi, Kristine y Renée Baillargeon (2005). “Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?” En: Science, Vol. 308, No. 5719, pp. 255-258.
Papineau, David (1987). Reality and Representation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Papineau, David (1993). Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Quine, Willard (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Riba, Carles (1990). La comunicación animal. Un enfoque zoosemiótico. Barcelona: Anthropos.
Roitblat, Herbert (1984). “El significado de la representación en la memo-ria animal”. En: María Teresa Anguera y Joaquín A. Veá (eds.). Conducta animal y representaciones mentales (pp. 89-144). Barcelona: PPU.
Santibáñez, Cristián (2012). “Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative Theory of Reasoning. From the Psychology of Reasoning to Argumenta-tion Studies”. En: Informal Logic, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 132-159.
Santibáñez, Cristián (2015). “Steps towards an evolutionary account of ar-gumentative competence”. En: Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 168-183.
Scott, Rose, Renée Baillargeon, Hyun Song y Alan Leslie (2010). “Attri-buting false beliefs about non-obvious properties at 18 months”. En: Cog-nitive Psychology, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 366-395.
Scott, Rose, Zijing He, Renée Baillargeon y Denise Cummins (2012). “False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: evidence from two novel ver-bal spontaneous-response tasks”. En: Developmental Science, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 181-193.
Shea, Nicholas (2012). “New thinking, innateness and inherited represen-tation”. En: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, Vol. 367, No. 1599, pp. 2234-2244.
Shea, Nicholas (2013a). “Naturalising representational content”. En:Phi-losophy Compass, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 496-509.
Shea, Nicholas (2013b). “Inherited Representations are Read in Deve-lopment”. En: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 1-31.
Sherwood, Chet, Francys Subiaul y Tadeusz Zawidzki (2008). “A natural history of the human mind: tracing evolutionary changes in brain and cog-nition”. En: Journal of Anatomy, Vol. 212, No. 4, pp. 426-454.
Southgate, Victoria, Coralie Chevallier y Gergel Csibra (2010). “Seven-teen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others’referential com-munication”. En: Developmental Science, Vol. 13, No. 6, pp. 907-912.
Stanovich, Keith (2011). Rationality and Reflective Mind. NY: Oxford Uni-versity Press.
Sterelny, Kim (2003). Thought in a Hostile World. The Evolution of Human Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Sterelny, Kim (2012). The Evolved Apprentice. How Evolution Made Hu-mans Unique. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Thagard, Paul (2005). Mind. Introduction to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Tomasello, Michael (2008). Origins of Human Communication. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Trauble, Birgit, Vesna Marinovic y Sabina Pauen (2010). “Early Theory of Mind Competencies: Do Infants Understand Others’ Beliefs?”. En: Infancy, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 434-444.
Walton, Douglas (2013). Methods of Argumentation. NY: Cambridge Uni-versity Press.
West, Stuart, Ashleigh Griffin y Andy Gardner (2007a). “Evolutionary Explanations for Cooperation”. En: Current Biology, Vol. 17, pp. 661-672.
West, Stuart, Ashleigh Griffin y Andy Gardner (2007b). “Social seman-tics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selec-tion”. En: Journal ofEvolutionary Biology, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 415-432.
Zawidzki, Tadeusz (2013). Mindshaping. A New Framework for Understan-ding Human Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Bermúdez, José (2003). Thinking without words. NY: Oxford University Press.
Bickerton, Derek (2014). More than Nature Needs. Language, Mind, and Evolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bickerton, Derek (1990). Language and Species. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Blackmore, Susan (1999). The Meme Machine. NY: Oxford University Press.
Bogdan, Radu (2013). Mindvaults. Sociocultural Grounds for Pretending and Imagining. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Boyd, Brian (2009). On the Origin of Stories. Evolution, Cognition, and Fic-tion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Buttelmann, David, Malinda Carpenter y Michael Tomasello (2009). “Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm”. En: Cognition, Vol. 112, pp. 337-342.
Carruthers, Peter (2011). The Opacity of Mind. An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. NY: Oxford University Press.
Churchland, Patricia (2011). Braintrust. What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Corbalis, Michael (2011). The Recursive Mind. The Origins of Human Lan-guage, Though, and Civilization. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cosmides, Leda y John Tooby (1992). “Cognitive adaptations for social exchange”. En: Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides y John Tooby (eds.). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (pp. 163-228). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Csibra, Gergely (2010). “Recognizing Communicative Intentions in In-fancy”. En: Mind & Language, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 141-168.
Deacon, Terrence (1997). The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Lan-guage and the Human Brain. London: Penguin.
Dennett, Daniel (1983). “Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: the “Panglossian paradigm” defended”. En: Behavioral and Brain Science, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 343-390.
Dennett, Daniel (1996). Kinds of Minds. Toward an Understanding of Consciousness. NY: Basic Books.
Dunbar, Robin (2004). The Human Story. Chatham, Kent: Faber & Faber.
Evans, Jonathan (2007). Hypothetical Thinking: Dual Processes in Reasoning and Judgement. Hove: Psychology Press.
Evans, Jonathan (2010). Thinking Twice. Two Minds in One Brain. NY: Oxford University Press.
Fehr, Ernst y Urs Fischbacher (2003). “The nature of human altruism”. En: Nature, Vol. 425, pp. 785-791.
Geary, David (2005). The Origin of Mind: Evolution of Brain, Cognition, and General Intelligence. Washington, DC: American Psychological Asso-ciation.
Goldman, Alvin (2006). Simulating Minds. The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. NY: Oxford University Press.
Gopnik, Alison (1996). “The scientist as child”. En: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 485-514.
Gordon, Robert (1996). “Radical simulationism”. En: Peter Carruthers y Peter Smith (eds.). Theories of Theories of Mind (pp. 11-21). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hurford, James (2007). The Origins of Meaning. Language in the Light of Evolution. NY: Oxford University Press.
Hwanga, Sung y Samuel Bowles (2012). “¿Is altruism bad for cooperation?” En: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 330-341.
Klima, Gyula (2011). “Tradition and Innovation in Medieval Theories of Mental Representation”. En: Gyula Klima y Alexander W. Hall (eds.). Mental Representation. Vol. 4: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics (pp. 7-16). Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Lewis, David (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lowe, Jonathon (2000). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mameli, Matteo (2001). “Mindreading, mindshaping, and evolution”. En: Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 16, pp. 491-514.
Marler, Peter (1977). “The evolution of Communication”. En: Thomas A. Sebeok (ed.). How Animals Communicate (pp. 45-70). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Mercier, Hugo y Dan Sperber (2011). “Why do human reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory”. En: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 57-74.
Nichols, Shaun y Stephen Stich (2003). Mindreading. NY: Oxford Uni-versity Press.
Onishi, Kristine y Renée Baillargeon (2005). “Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?” En: Science, Vol. 308, No. 5719, pp. 255-258.
Papineau, David (1987). Reality and Representation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Papineau, David (1993). Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Quine, Willard (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Riba, Carles (1990). La comunicación animal. Un enfoque zoosemiótico. Barcelona: Anthropos.
Roitblat, Herbert (1984). “El significado de la representación en la memo-ria animal”. En: María Teresa Anguera y Joaquín A. Veá (eds.). Conducta animal y representaciones mentales (pp. 89-144). Barcelona: PPU.
Santibáñez, Cristián (2012). “Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative Theory of Reasoning. From the Psychology of Reasoning to Argumenta-tion Studies”. En: Informal Logic, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 132-159.
Santibáñez, Cristián (2015). “Steps towards an evolutionary account of ar-gumentative competence”. En: Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 168-183.
Scott, Rose, Renée Baillargeon, Hyun Song y Alan Leslie (2010). “Attri-buting false beliefs about non-obvious properties at 18 months”. En: Cog-nitive Psychology, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 366-395.
Scott, Rose, Zijing He, Renée Baillargeon y Denise Cummins (2012). “False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: evidence from two novel ver-bal spontaneous-response tasks”. En: Developmental Science, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 181-193.
Shea, Nicholas (2012). “New thinking, innateness and inherited represen-tation”. En: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, Vol. 367, No. 1599, pp. 2234-2244.
Shea, Nicholas (2013a). “Naturalising representational content”. En:Phi-losophy Compass, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 496-509.
Shea, Nicholas (2013b). “Inherited Representations are Read in Deve-lopment”. En: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 1-31.
Sherwood, Chet, Francys Subiaul y Tadeusz Zawidzki (2008). “A natural history of the human mind: tracing evolutionary changes in brain and cog-nition”. En: Journal of Anatomy, Vol. 212, No. 4, pp. 426-454.
Southgate, Victoria, Coralie Chevallier y Gergel Csibra (2010). “Seven-teen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others’referential com-munication”. En: Developmental Science, Vol. 13, No. 6, pp. 907-912.
Stanovich, Keith (2011). Rationality and Reflective Mind. NY: Oxford Uni-versity Press.
Sterelny, Kim (2003). Thought in a Hostile World. The Evolution of Human Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Sterelny, Kim (2012). The Evolved Apprentice. How Evolution Made Hu-mans Unique. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Thagard, Paul (2005). Mind. Introduction to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Tomasello, Michael (2008). Origins of Human Communication. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Trauble, Birgit, Vesna Marinovic y Sabina Pauen (2010). “Early Theory of Mind Competencies: Do Infants Understand Others’ Beliefs?”. En: Infancy, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 434-444.
Walton, Douglas (2013). Methods of Argumentation. NY: Cambridge Uni-versity Press.
West, Stuart, Ashleigh Griffin y Andy Gardner (2007a). “Evolutionary Explanations for Cooperation”. En: Current Biology, Vol. 17, pp. 661-672.
West, Stuart, Ashleigh Griffin y Andy Gardner (2007b). “Social seman-tics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selec-tion”. En: Journal ofEvolutionary Biology, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 415-432.
Zawidzki, Tadeusz (2013). Mindshaping. A New Framework for Understan-ding Human Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
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Dez 1, 2015
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Santibáñez Yáñez, C. (2015). Mindreading, representación, inferencia y argumentación. Co-Herencia, 12(23), 171–204. https://doi.org/10.17230/co-herencia.12.23.7
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Biografia Autor
Cristián Santibáñez Yáñez, Universidad Diego Portales-Chile.
Ph.D., Universidad de Houston, Estados Unidos. Profesor asociado, Facultad de Psicología, Universidad Diego Portales-Chile.
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