Philosophy of Mind and Psychiatry Reach and Boundaries of a Biological Account to the Study of Delusions
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Keywords
Psychiatry, philosophy of mind, naturalism, psychiatric disorders, de-lusions, reductionism, eliminativism
Abstract
This paper focuses on the philosophical study of delusions as an example of the link that can be established between the philosophy of mind and psychiatry. Against radically naturalistic versions that suggest reductionist or eliminativist variables to explain certain mental phenomena and their ‘abnormal’ variables, I will stand up for a toned-down version of the naturalistic perspective. In this sense, I will point out that it is necessary to keep some level of sympathy towards naturalism in the philosophical research on delusions to develop the theories about the empirically informed beliefs that do not contradict the current developments on cognitive psychology and neurosciences. Nevertheless, I will also state that an exclusively naturalist perspective –from both philosophy and psychiatry itself- cannot render an account of the regulatory context within which beliefs develop. Normative, particularly external, criteria (social and pragmatic) used to classify certain beliefs as delirious are not intelligible under a purely natural explanation. Conversely, to understand delusional beliefs as delusional, it will be necessary to take an interest in a hybrid approach that considers the natural causes of the phenomenon as well as its normative assessment.
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Article Details
Emilia Vilatta, Instituto de Humanidades, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (IDH-CONICET-UNC).
Pabellón Agustín Tosco 1° Piso.(Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades)
Ciudad Universitaria Córdoba, Argentina
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