Filosofía de la mente y Psiquiatría alcances y límites de una perspectiva naturalista para el estudio de los delirios
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En el presente artículo me concentraré en el estudio filosófico de los delirios, como un caso ejemplificador del vínculo que pueden establecer la filosofía de la mente y la psiquiatría. Frente a versiones radicalmente naturalistas, que proponen variantes reduccionistas o eliminativistas para la explicación de ciertos fenómenos mentales y sus variantes “anormales”, defenderé una versión moderada de la perspectiva naturalista. Al respecto, señalaré que retener algún grado de simpatía hacia el naturalismo en las investigaciones filosóficas sobre los delirios es necesario para desarrollar teorías sobre las creencias empíricamente informadas que no resulten contradictorias con los desarrollos actuales en psicología cognitiva y neurociencias. No obstante, afirmaré también que una perspectiva exclusivamente naturalista -tanto por parte de la filosofía como de la psiquiatría misma- es incapaz de dar cuenta del contexto normativo en donde juegan las creencias. Los criterios normativos, especialmente externos (sociales y pragmáticos) que se emplean para clasificar ciertas creencias como delirantes no resultan inteligibles bajo una explicación puramente natural. Por el contrario, para comprender las creencias delirantes qua delirantes, será preciso acercarnos a un abordaje híbrido que pueda contemplar las causas naturales del fenómeno así como su evaluación normativa.
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Referências
American Psychiatric Association [APA] (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders: DSM-V-TM (5th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
Andreasen, N. (1984). The biological revolution in Psychiatry. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
Andreasen, N. (2001). Brave new brain: Conquering mental illness in the era of the genome. New York: Oxford University Press.
Andreasen, N. (2005). The creating brain. New York: Dana Press.
Arpaly, N. (2005). How it is not “just like diabetes”: mental disorders and the moral psychologist. Philosophical Issues, 1(15), 282-298.
Balestri, M., Calati, R. & de Ronchi, D. (2014). Genetic modulation of personality traits: a systematic review of the literature. International Clinical Psychopharmacology, 1(29), 1-15.
Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2005). In defence of the doxastic conception of delusion. Mind & Language, 2(20), 163-188.
Bell, D. (2003). Paranoia. Cambridge: Icon.
Bentall, R., Corcoran, R., Howard, R., Blackwood, N. & Kinderman, P. (2001). Persecutory delusions: a review and theoretical integration. Clinical Psychology Review, 1(21), 1143-1192.
Bermúdez, J. (2003). Thinking without words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blackwood, N., Howard, R., Bentall, R. & Murray, R. (2001). Cognitive neuropsychiatric models of persecutory delusions. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1(158), 527-539.
Bortolotti, L. (2005). Delusions and the background of rationality. Mind and Language, 2(20), 189-208.
Bortolotti, L. (2015). The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions. Consciousness & Cognition, 33(1), 490-499.
Bortolotti, L. & Miyazono, K. (2015). Recent Work on the Nature and Development of delusions. Philosophy Compass, 10 (9), 636-645.
Bracken, P., Thomas, P., Timimi, S. & Yeomans, D. (2012). Psychiatry beyond the current paradigm. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 6(201), 430-434.
Charney, D., Nestler, E. & Bunney, B. (1999). Neurobiology of mental illness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chaufan, C. & Joseph, J. (2013). The “missing heritability” of common disorders: should health researchers care? International Journal of Health Services, 2(43), 281-303.
Colbert, S. & Peters, E. (2002). Need for closure and jumping-to-conclusions in delusion-prone individuals. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1(190), 27-31.
Coltheart, M. (2007). Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 8(60), 1041-1062.
Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R. & Breen, N. (2001). Monothematic delusions: Towards a two- factor account. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 3(8), 133-158.
Dennett, D. (1998). La actitud intencional. Barcelona: Gedisa.
Graham, G. (2010). The disordered mind: an introduction to philosophy of mind and mental illness. London: Routledge.
Graham (2013). Ordering Disorder: mental disorder, brain disorder and therapeutic intervention. En K. Fuldford, M. Davies, R. Gipps, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini & T. Thornton (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kapur, S. (2003). Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1(160), 13-23.
Kapur, S., Phillips, A. & Insel, T. (2012). Why has it taken so long for biological psychiatry to develop clinical tests and what to do about it? Molecular Psychiatry, 12(17), 117-149.
Kendler, K. (2012). The dappled nature of causes of psychiatric illness: replacing the organic functional/hardware software dichotomy with empirically based pluralism. Molecular Psychiatry, 4(17), 377-388.
McDowell, J. (2003). Mente y Mundo. Salamanca: Editorial Sígueme.
McKay, R. & Dennett, D. (2009). The evolution of misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6(32), 493-561.
McKay, R., Langdon, R. & Colheart, M. (2009). Sleights of mind: Delusions, and self deception. En: T. Bayne & J. Fernández (Eds.), Delusion and Self deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation. Hove: Psychology Press.
Miller, J., Ding, S. & Sunkin, S. (2014). Transcriptional landscape of the prenatal human brain”. En: Nature, 1(508), 199-206.
Moncrieff, J. & Middleton, H. (2015). Schizophrenia: a critical psychiatry perspective. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 3(28), 264-268.
Pavlickova, H., Varese, F., Smith, A., Myin-Germeys, I., Turnbull, O. & Bentall, R. (2013). The dynamics of mood and coping in bipolar disorder: longitudinal investigations of the inter-relationship between affect, self-esteem and response styles. PLoS ONE Journal, 4(8), 1-2.
Read, J., Mosher, L. & Bentall, R. (2015). Models of Madness Psychological, Social and Biological Approaches to Psychosis (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Sellars, W. (1971). Ciencia, percepción y realidad. Madrid: Tecnos.
Stich, S. (1990). The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Stone, T. & Young, A. (1998). Delusions and brain injury. The philosophy and psychology of belief. Mind and Language, 1(12), 327-364.
Szasz, T. (2008). El mito de la enfermedad mental. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.
Timimi, S. (2014). No more psychiatric labels: why formal psychiatric diagnostic systems should be abolished. International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology, 3(13), 208-215.
Andreasen, N. (1984). The biological revolution in Psychiatry. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
Andreasen, N. (2001). Brave new brain: Conquering mental illness in the era of the genome. New York: Oxford University Press.
Andreasen, N. (2005). The creating brain. New York: Dana Press.
Arpaly, N. (2005). How it is not “just like diabetes”: mental disorders and the moral psychologist. Philosophical Issues, 1(15), 282-298.
Balestri, M., Calati, R. & de Ronchi, D. (2014). Genetic modulation of personality traits: a systematic review of the literature. International Clinical Psychopharmacology, 1(29), 1-15.
Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2005). In defence of the doxastic conception of delusion. Mind & Language, 2(20), 163-188.
Bell, D. (2003). Paranoia. Cambridge: Icon.
Bentall, R., Corcoran, R., Howard, R., Blackwood, N. & Kinderman, P. (2001). Persecutory delusions: a review and theoretical integration. Clinical Psychology Review, 1(21), 1143-1192.
Bermúdez, J. (2003). Thinking without words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blackwood, N., Howard, R., Bentall, R. & Murray, R. (2001). Cognitive neuropsychiatric models of persecutory delusions. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1(158), 527-539.
Bortolotti, L. (2005). Delusions and the background of rationality. Mind and Language, 2(20), 189-208.
Bortolotti, L. (2015). The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions. Consciousness & Cognition, 33(1), 490-499.
Bortolotti, L. & Miyazono, K. (2015). Recent Work on the Nature and Development of delusions. Philosophy Compass, 10 (9), 636-645.
Bracken, P., Thomas, P., Timimi, S. & Yeomans, D. (2012). Psychiatry beyond the current paradigm. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 6(201), 430-434.
Charney, D., Nestler, E. & Bunney, B. (1999). Neurobiology of mental illness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chaufan, C. & Joseph, J. (2013). The “missing heritability” of common disorders: should health researchers care? International Journal of Health Services, 2(43), 281-303.
Colbert, S. & Peters, E. (2002). Need for closure and jumping-to-conclusions in delusion-prone individuals. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1(190), 27-31.
Coltheart, M. (2007). Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 8(60), 1041-1062.
Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R. & Breen, N. (2001). Monothematic delusions: Towards a two- factor account. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 3(8), 133-158.
Dennett, D. (1998). La actitud intencional. Barcelona: Gedisa.
Graham, G. (2010). The disordered mind: an introduction to philosophy of mind and mental illness. London: Routledge.
Graham (2013). Ordering Disorder: mental disorder, brain disorder and therapeutic intervention. En K. Fuldford, M. Davies, R. Gipps, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini & T. Thornton (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kapur, S. (2003). Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1(160), 13-23.
Kapur, S., Phillips, A. & Insel, T. (2012). Why has it taken so long for biological psychiatry to develop clinical tests and what to do about it? Molecular Psychiatry, 12(17), 117-149.
Kendler, K. (2012). The dappled nature of causes of psychiatric illness: replacing the organic functional/hardware software dichotomy with empirically based pluralism. Molecular Psychiatry, 4(17), 377-388.
McDowell, J. (2003). Mente y Mundo. Salamanca: Editorial Sígueme.
McKay, R. & Dennett, D. (2009). The evolution of misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6(32), 493-561.
McKay, R., Langdon, R. & Colheart, M. (2009). Sleights of mind: Delusions, and self deception. En: T. Bayne & J. Fernández (Eds.), Delusion and Self deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation. Hove: Psychology Press.
Miller, J., Ding, S. & Sunkin, S. (2014). Transcriptional landscape of the prenatal human brain”. En: Nature, 1(508), 199-206.
Moncrieff, J. & Middleton, H. (2015). Schizophrenia: a critical psychiatry perspective. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 3(28), 264-268.
Pavlickova, H., Varese, F., Smith, A., Myin-Germeys, I., Turnbull, O. & Bentall, R. (2013). The dynamics of mood and coping in bipolar disorder: longitudinal investigations of the inter-relationship between affect, self-esteem and response styles. PLoS ONE Journal, 4(8), 1-2.
Read, J., Mosher, L. & Bentall, R. (2015). Models of Madness Psychological, Social and Biological Approaches to Psychosis (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Sellars, W. (1971). Ciencia, percepción y realidad. Madrid: Tecnos.
Stich, S. (1990). The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Stone, T. & Young, A. (1998). Delusions and brain injury. The philosophy and psychology of belief. Mind and Language, 1(12), 327-364.
Szasz, T. (2008). El mito de la enfermedad mental. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.
Timimi, S. (2014). No more psychiatric labels: why formal psychiatric diagnostic systems should be abolished. International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology, 3(13), 208-215.
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Publicado
Out 5, 2017
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Como Citar
Vilatta, E. (2017). Filosofía de la mente y Psiquiatría: alcances y límites de una perspectiva naturalista para el estudio de los delirios. Co-Herencia, 14(27), 159–180. https://doi.org/10.17230/co-herencia.14.27.7
Edição
Secção
Filosofía
Biografia Autor
Emilia Vilatta, Instituto de Humanidades, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (IDH-CONICET-UNC).
Pabellón Agustín Tosco 1° Piso.(Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades)
Ciudad Universitaria Córdoba, Argentina
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